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ABSTRACT 
 
The firms and financial institutions claim that ESG factors can have long-term 
significances on a firm’s financial performance, either for healthier or for 
poorer. This paper focused on two areas of studied, firstly, about the 
relationship between the firm’s performance and Environmental, Social, 
Governance (ESG) disclosure using Bloomberg Terminal as a main sources. 
Secondly, this paper also will explain further whether ownership of the 
company will influence ESG disclosure or not. The study found that ESg as 
positive significant relationship with the firm performance, which are return 
on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA) and pretax margin (PTMR) but 
negative significant relationship between price to book ratio (PB). The finding 
was consistent with the previous research. However, the second area of 
study was found that the ownership not significant on ESG disclosure. This is 
contrary to previous studies. The quantitative research was regressed using 
Eviews after the panel data of the five countries which are UK, France, 
Germany, China ad Malaysia was obtained from Year 2009 to 2012.  
 
Keywords: 
Environmental,social,governance (ESG), ownership, firm performance, return 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) themes are becoming well known 
and increasingly material to the value of companies; however, there is still 
no “clear” definition of what is encompassed by “Socially Responsible 
Investment” (SRI), meaning wide scope for interpretation on the part of 
investors (Ouaknine, Whooley and Crozat, 2013). The approach may seem 
“simple”, “attractive” or “blurred”. To become actionable, it needs to be 
clearly defined in terms of criteria and objectives as one methodology might 
not fit all investors‟ needs. Ouaknine, Whooley and Crozat (2013) added that 
ESG integration refers to the concept that all types of investors should 
examine, à minima, a limited number of companies‟ environmental, social 
and governance practices that have a material impact on their financial 
performance. 
 
Roy and Gitman (2012) also refer ESG integration to the idea that all types of 
investors should examine companies’ sustainability practices and 
performance because they can have a material impact on the financial 
performance of companies. Their report findings revealed the following ESG 
investment trends. Firstly, despite the relentless short-termism pervasive in 
the current economy, there is a growing interest from mainstream investors 
in long-term investment opportunities and ESG integration. Secondly, asset 
owners, including pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign 
wealth funds, which have long-term liabilities and a fiduciary duty to their 
members, are leading the way by integrating ESG criteria across their entire 
portfolio. Thirdly, these investors are increasingly looking at the ESG 
performance of the companies they invest in as a way to improve the 
financial performance of their investment portfolio (Roy and Gitman, 2012).  
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In Bassen and Kova’cs (2008) research, they stated that, ESG consist of many 
important nonfinancial  data can give big influence to the company’s value 
up to 66 percent. In addition, Moore and Wen (2008) claim that ‘‘good 
business ethics’’ can lead to long-term value creation 
 
Bloomberg (2012) revealed that in today’s complex, highly regulated 
financial environment, valuing potential investments demands thorough, 
uncompromising analysis. To fully understand d future prospects, the work 
must extend beyond such financial measures as P/E, book value, EPS and 
dividend yield Today, discerning professional investors also examine a broad 
cross section of environmental, social and governance measures (ESG), such 
as resource efficiency, emissions management, community relations, 
workforce development and broad/committee structures.  
 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) has proven that can offer or give 
advantage to the investors in decision making for  long-term investment 
performance (ESG Managers Portfolio, n.d.). Besides, ESG has turned out to 
be solved for investment approaches that hold ESG or sustainability elements 
as a resource in helping to determine the firms with superior business 
models. Environmental, social and governance records, commonly referred 
to as ESG, are intangible, extra-financial measures of valuation, risk, 
derivative from a company’s operational decisions, HR policies and practices, 
and corporate governance structures (Bloomberg, 2012). 
 
Investors and corporate executives are increasingly embracing the concept 
that ESG information resource efficiency, good community relations, training 
and developing the workforce, and board/committee structures, for example 
may directly impact companies’ reputation, value and performance. 
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Governments, regulatory bodies and exchanges are encouraging more ESG 
data disclosure and, crucially, the standardization and verification of ESG 
data disclosure (Bloomberg, 2012). 
 
Peiris and Evans (2010) in their study also mentioned that one certain set of 
extra-financials has been experiencing soaring scrutiny within the last years, 
namely aspects allied to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues 
Although the terminology is employed in various contexts – risk valuation, 
socially responsible investment, corporate responsibility, etc. – up to present 
there is no clear general understanding of this concept (Peiris and Evans, 
2010). Scholar added that the term appears in the United Nations Principles 
of Responsible Investment and is also used by major business consulting 
firms. Yet business and academic literature lag behind a definite attempt. 
The concept of ESG issues refers to extra-financial, material information 
about the challenges and performance of a company in these matters (Peiris 
and Evans, 2010).  
 
It is evident that the evaluation of ESG matters enables a thorough 
understanding of the risks and opportunities a company faces, allowing 
enhanced security selection and risk management (Peiris and Evans, 2010). 
Furthermore, ESG performance may serve “as a proxy for management 
quality, in so far as it reflects the company’s ability to respond to long term 
trends and maintain competitive advantage” (Ling, Forest, Lynch and Fox, 
2007). Additionally, ESG analysis leads to enriched understanding of how 
future trends might affect a certain business or the entire economic 
landscape for that matter. Finance professionals, for instance, anticipate that 
ESG issues and climate change in particular will “gradually but powerfully 
change the economic landscape” in which companies operate and “cause 
periodic sharp movements in asset prices” (Llewellyn, 2007). Thus, while of 
fundamental relevance within socially responsible investment (SRI) strategies, 
ESG measures actually bare significant importance for mainstream business 
ESG in Focus 
 
U1249714 Page 17 
 
valuation and investment decision-making, particularly in the perspective of 
long-term performance and risk evaluation (Derwall, 2007) in (Peiris and 
Evans, 2010). 
 
Attention on ESG arose in the 1970s through the efforts of a small body of 
investors who were interested in the environmental and social practices of 
the companies they invested in (Richardson, 2009). More recently, one might 
debate that the focus on ESG has been heightened by the efforts of the two 
institutions (Galbreath, 2013). First, in 2006, the United Nations launched 
the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) (UN PRI, 2006). The PRI are 
becoming de facto standards for taking ESG issues into account when 
determining the character of mainstream investment practices (Galbreath, 
2013). Galbreath (2013) stated that in fact, the PRI emphases on institutional 
investors and at the time of researcher writing, had over 900 signatories 
from around the world, representing US$30 trillion in investment dollars 
under management (UN PRI 2011). Second, evolving from collaboration 
between the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the Coalition 
for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), the Global Reporting 
Initial (GRI) was established in 2001 (Galbreath, 2013). Initially focused on a 
framework for environmental performance reporting, the third generation 
(G3) of the GRI Principles, published in 2006, has expanded to issues beyond 
the environment. The GRI Principles now cover six classes: environmental; 
human rights; labour practices and decent work; society; product 
responsibility; and economic. While governance issues are not a category of 
separate focus, they are covered, particularly under the economic category 
(Galbreath, 2013). Recent analysis suggests that the GRI Principles are used 
by over 1300 companies, governments, social sector, and other 
organizations (Boerner, 2011) in Galbreath (2013). In the year 2013, the 
fourth generation of the GRI Principles is expected to be published 
(Galbreath, 2013). 
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ESG is generally interrelated to ethical or socially responsible investment 
(Richardson, 2009), ESG has become key indicators of management 
competence, risk management, and non-financial performance (Boerner, 
2011). Richardson (2009) added that the investment community, particularly 
sees ESG as important, as ESG issues are increasingly seen as financially 
‘‘material’’ to an investment portfolio ESG then, broadly, covers a variety of 
issues related to the environment (e.g., climate change, energy and water 
use, carbon emissions), social responsibility (e.g., fair trade principles, 
human rights, product safety, gender equality, health and safety), and 
corporate governance (e.g., board independence, corruption and bribery, 
reporting and disclosure, shareholder protection) (Richardson, 2009). 
 
ESG is a market undergoing major transformation (Ouaknine, Whooley and 
Crozat, 2013). Beyond the fast-paced growth of SRI funds, ESG integration 
directly applies to 20% of all AUMs, measured by the “Global Sustainable 
Investment Alliance” (GSIA). Integrating ESG aspects is increasingly a part of 
asset managers’ fiduciary responsibility. Furthermore, the materiality of ESG 
issues has increased, and their integration into financial analysis has become 
an important performance driver. Thus, material ESG drivers should be 
identified in conjunction with macroeconomic and financial drivers 
(Ouaknine, Whooley and Crozat, 2013). 
 
Walden Asset Management (2010) stated that given the associated spectrum 
of financial outcomes, corporate executives and investors who measure, 
manage and disclose their policies and performance on ESG factors may have 
the greatest insight on this key dimension of overall company performance. 
Corporations have an opportunity to improve their financial performance by 
maintaining their licenses to operate, mitigating risks, realizing efficiencies, 
positioning themselves competitively, and identifying supplementary sources 
of revenues (Walden Asset Management, 2010). For executives and investors 
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an appreciation of material ESG aspects over a long-term horizon is integral 
to a sustainable business model. 
 
Researchers have over the past 40 years examined various pathways through 
which ESG issues can impact company performance in multiple contexts, in 
emerging and developed markets, over different time periods, and as a 
function of both regulation and voluntary initiatives (Koehler and 
Hespenheide, 2013). They added that, the strongest evidence that ESG 
performance impacts financial performance is found in short-term event 
studies, which put the spotlight on the link between ESG information and 
investor interest and decisions. An extensive range of ESG events has been 
studied, including the negative impact on stock returns of corporate criminal 
activity, to violations of labour and environmental laws and product recalls 
(Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013). 
 
In addition, Koehler and Hespenheide (2013) also stated that environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) issues can impact company financial 
performance tied directly to its operations or products, or indirectly through 
stakeholder actions along the entire value chain, for example: (1) Direct 
operations risk: Accidents/spills/equipment failure; Environmental (pollution, 
e.g., carbon emissions, water pollution, penalties, and fines); and Social 
(employee strikes, wage concerns, health and safety), (2)Supply chain risk: 
Social (e.g.: child labor); Ingredients/natural resource use, such as palm oil, 
old growth forest, or water; and Weather catastrophes, and (3) Product risk: 
Ingredients (toxic chemicals, genetically modified organisms); Product 
performance, recalls, boycotts; Governance; and Board composition and 
independence. Additionally, in Deloitte Review, Koehler and Hespenheide 
(2013) stated that according to Dan Hanson, managing director at 
BlackRock, ESG is a proxy for risk that is not priced in, and companies that 
better manage these risks can deliver returns with greater certainty. 
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Despite the fact that financial markets worldwide have undergone substantial 
stress and change, a growing number of mainstream investors see ESG 
integration as a way to improve their long-term financial performance and to 
respond to the increasing client demand for sustainable investments (Roy 
and Gitman, 2012). This trend offers business opportunities to attract long-
term investors, while at the same time, reducing their shareholder turnover, 
aligning their investment strategy with the real needs of their business, and 
laying down the foundation for a sustainable future (Roy and Gitman, 2012). 
 
Research Question  
1) The company performance declared in the annual report, are they 
subjective by ESG, while the other factors remain the same? 
2) There has many factors contribute to ESG score, did the ownership of the 
institution one of the contributor? 
 
Research Objective  
1) To critically evaluate whether the ESG performance plays the important 
role in the profitability of the institution or not. 
2) To investigate the relationship between the ownership of the institution 
and the ESG score 
 
Scope of Study 
The study focuses on ESG performance in certain developed and developing 
countries which are United Kingdom, France, Germany as developed 
countries, while from developing countries is China and Malaysia. This 
research confined to listed companies their indexes at least for 10 years 
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because the period of this study is from the year 2009 until year 2012 and 
the total is 306 of the companies. 
 
Justification of Study 
Since the findings are inconsistent based on the previous studies, I would 
like to examine the relationship between firm performance and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) using Bloomberg Terminal. 
Usually,the previous was used KLD, Asset4 ad other sources to gather all 
data. The evaluation of ESG score might be different due to different 
sources. Furthermore, in my study, the data covered developed and 
developing countries. This might affect the result in findings later.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEWS 
 
The literature review was divided into three segments , since this is the new 
topic for environmental, social, governance (ESG) research. Basically, the 
previous studies were based on individual components of ESG with the firm 
performance.  
 
2.1 Environmental with company performance 
The environmental score consists of environmental aspects, whereby 
the conventional ones being emission reductions and low consumption 
of resources as well as product innovations aiming at improving the 
environmental protection (Dorfleitner, Utz and Wimmer, 2013). 
Finance professionals, for instance, as stated in Llewellyn (2007) 
anticipate that ESG issues and climate change in particular will 
steadily, but powerfully change the economic landscape in which 
companies operate and “cause periodic sharp movements in asset 
prices”. 
 
Schiereck and Konigs (2008) mentioned that climate change as one of 
the greatest prominent environmental issues facing companies has a 
particular relevance for financial markets. In future, the firms might 
have operated under different environments (Bassen, 2007). For 
instance, carbon-intensive industries, such as oil, gas and the utilities 
sector will be highly impacted, with further climate change regulations 
affecting all sectors, as well as those outside these specific industries.  
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Smith (2011) in his study mentioned that, with the Principles of 
Responsible Investing (PRI), investors see addressed the issues of 
climate and water as central business challenges as well as 
sustainability questions. Companies which are unprepared to address 
such issues may expose long-term shareholder value and negatively 
affect their portfolios.  
 
The concern of ESG issues is gradually being recognized as part of an 
institutional investor’s fiduciary responsibility (Smith, 2011). Freshfield 
Bruckhaus Deringer, the world’s fourth largest law firm, released a 
report examining the legality of considering ESG issues in the 
investment process in 2005 and at that point stated that integration 
was permissible and arguably required in all jurisdictions. These are 
further supported by the U.N. Environmental Program Finance Initiative 
and argued that it is the responsibility of investment consultants and 
asset managers to discuss ESG considerations with their clients when 
they first enter into a relationship to avoid future legal repercussions 
should an ESG issue have a negative impact on the fund (Smith, 2011). 
 
Galbreath (2012) in his research stated that according to Scott (2001), 
the institutional environment comprises three types of institutions: (1) 
regulative, (2) normative, and (3) cognitive. Regulative influences 
comprise formal rules and incentives constructed by the state and 
other agents of the collective good. Normative influences comprise of 
the informal rules related to values and explicit moral commitments. 
While, cognitive influences encompass abstract rules allied with the 
structure of cognitive distinctions and taken for granted 
understandings. It is said that the three institutional pillars are 
interconnected and internally constant (Scott, 2001). A focus beyond 
corporate governance can be found, for instance, in the Australian 
Corporations Act of 2001. Section 299 (1)(f) which requires companies 
who are ‘‘subject to any particular and significant environmental 
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regulation’’ to report on performance in relation to such regulation 
(Galbreath, 2012). 
 
Investigation on the influence of environmental aspects of firm value 
by Semenova and Hassel (2008) displayed that there is generally a 
positive relationship between the two factors. It was then argued that 
eco-friendly firms have the advantages of preparedness and 
performance, and that even though these companies might have 
higher costs, they could still be more profitable due to the willingness 
of customers to pay higher prices. Additionally, the superior 
reputation could lead to a higher market value. Guenster, Bauer, 
Derwall, and Koedijk (2011) in Dorfleitner et al. (2013) contribute the 
evidence relating to the fact that the market seems to completely 
acknowledge the financial benefits of eco-efficiency only with a delay. 
 
Dorfleitner et al. (2013) stated that in the environmental dimension, it 
is argued that firms with a high Corporate Social Performance (CSP) are 
prepared in a better way if regulatory changes (e.g. With respect to 
pollution rights) are implemented. Additionally, customers possibly 
will pay higher prices and the company may profit from a better 
reputation. A high CSP in the environment dimension mainly works by 
addressing customers and society as stakeholders (Dorfleitner et al., 
2013). Furthermore, in the social dimension such a mechanism can be 
in place (e.g. With respect to child labour), but the Corporate Financial 
Performance (CFP) can also be influenced positively through treating 
the employees as stakeholders well, who in turn will perform better in 
their jobs.  
 
Peiris and Evans (2010) mentioned that in Galema, Platinga, and 
Scholtens (2008) studies show that ESG rating (for diversity, 
environmental standards, and product) has a significant negative 
(positive) effect on book-to-market (market-to-book) ratios, pointing to 
a link with stock return. Furthermore, Galema et al. (2008) also 
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implement a four-factor model at the stock level to display that return 
outperformance is not significant for stocks screened on strength and 
distress scores for several DSI ratings criteria. In addition, Brammer, 
Brooks and Pavelin (2006) in Peiris and Evans (2010) adopts a cross-
sectional Fama Macbeth approach and find that higher environmental 
and community relations correspond to lower returns, while 
employment ratings are positively related to returns, although not 
significantly so. 
 
2.2 Social with company performance 
The social performance of a corporation is a key factor of the company 
performance also in the framework of ESG performance indicators 
(Kocmanova and Simberova, 2012). The trend, which put emphasis on 
the social aspects, is the conception of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Carroll, 1999). The social score usually comprises issues such as 
customer and product responsibility, societal aspects such as cash 
donations, efforts to protect public health and respecting business 
ethics, e.g. by avoiding corruption or by caring for human rights 
aspects Dorfleitner et al. (2013). In addition, this dimension contains 
some aspects concerning the workforce, for example, with respect to 
health or diversity. 
 
Evans and Peiris (2010) in their study mentioned that Socially 
Responsible Investing (SRI) has grown to be an important segment of 
the investment market over the past decade, representing around 10% 
of overall managed assets in both the US and Europe (Social 
Investment Forum 2008). In The Social Investment Forum (2006), SRI 
was defines as the screening of investments on the basis of social and 
ethical factors, shareholder advocacy,' and community investing, which 
directs capital toward communities that would otherwise lack such 
resources. In contrast to traditionally investing, SRI aims to achieve 
both a desirable long-term social outcome as well as an investment 
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return consistent with the social priorities and chosen screens of 
investors (Peiris and Evans, 2010). 
 
Bassen and Kovacs (2008) study stated that a fundamental relevance 
within socially responsible investment (SRI) strategies, ESG measures 
actually bare significant importance for mainstream business valuation 
and investment decision-making, especially in the context of long-term 
performance and risk evaluation (Derwall, 2007). Due to the long-term 
nature of the SR activity's effect, as exemplified by the findings of 
Edmans (2011), Deng, Kang and Low (2013) or Guenster et al. (2011), 
Dorfleitner et al. (2013) consider returns from holding a stock with 
high (or low) E, S, or G score for a longer period, possibly for several 
years. The results also show that for Europe and North America a high 
CSP leads to positive or zero abnormal returns over short investment 
horizons and is rewarded in the long run for all three dimensions. 
Additionally, for Japan and for the Asia Pacific region, only the 
governance dimension and the social dimension, respectively yield 
positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), while the 
corresponding other dimensions show negative or insignificant BHARs 
(Dorfleitner et al., 2013). Moreover, the results also show that a high 
CSP today can save money and yield high (unexpected by the market) 
cash flows in future periods. 
 
On top of that, Statman and Glushkov (2009) claim that, for the 
investor, it is conceivable to achieve both a high CSP and a high CFP at 
the same time if they follows the best-in-class approach, the results of 
meta-studies such as Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes(2003) and Margolis, 
Elfenbein and Walsh (2009) rather relatives these findings. Indeed, 
earlier studies show that some dissenting evidence regarding the 
influence of CSP on CFP do exist (Dorfleitner et al., 2013). Konar and 
Cohen (2001), for instance, find a positive significant relationship, 
while Boyle, Higgins and Rhee (1997) find negative relationships and 
Hillman and Keim (2001) results does not have any conclusive 
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relationship. Dorfleitner et al. (2013) mentioned that several articles 
give clear indications of the fact that a positive CSP lowers the equity 
(Ghoul, Guedhami and Kwok, 2011) and debt (Chava, Livdan and 
Purnanandam, 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011) cost of capital of a 
company, which obviously also creates value. 
 
Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) revealed that organizations with 
superior CSR performance are better positioned to acquire financing in 
the capital markets. In turn, relaxation of capital constrains positively 
affects the capability of firms to embark on profitable strategic 
investments that otherwise they would not, and stock market 
performance (e.g., Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001). Thus, 
identifying tangible firm features that are allied to the capital 
constraints a firm faces. Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) also 
stated that conferring to the most recent UN Global Compact – 
Accenture CEO study (2010), 93 percent of the 766 partaker CEOs 
from all over the world declared CSR as an “important” or “very 
important” factor in their organizations’ future success. 
 
In addition, further latest work centres on understanding the role of 
capital markets as an intermediate mechanism, though which CSR can 
create long-term value. For example, Lee and Faff (2009) demonstrates 
that companies with high CSR scores have lower idiosyncratic risk, 
while Goss (2009) shows that establishments with low CSR scores are 
more to be expected to experience financial distress. On top of that, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011) study focus on a sample of 
US firms find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit lower cost of 
equity capital. 
 
Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) conclude that, they postulate that 
firms with superior CSR performance will face lower idiosyncratic 
capital constraints because of two mechanisms: a) reduced agency 
costs and revenue/profit generating potential consequential from 
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more effective stakeholder engagement and b) reduced informational 
asymmetry resulting from further extended and more reliable CSR 
disclosure practices and transparency (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2011). 
 
Peiris and Evans (2010) paper confirms previous research by Brammer 
et al. (2006) and Galema et al. (2008) regarding lack of consistency in 
the relationship between ESG ratings and stock return, a clear positive 
relationship is found between a firm's stakeholder-related ESG ratings 
and its operating performance and market valuation, implying higher 
earnings expectations for high-rated stocks. The results also 
recommend that employment conditions are a more pertinent 
influence than other stakeholder criteria, and that a company's 
engrossment in more general non-stakeholder related social issues in 
general contributes negatively to both underlying operating 
performance and stock return (Peiris and Evans, 2010). The study 
suggests that broader ESG factors have potentially influenced a 
company's financial performance and are a relevant consideration in 
investment decision-makers. 
 
In Dorfleitner et al. (2013) findings clearly show that financial markets 
are not capable of pricing different levels of corporate social 
performance properly in the short run and, in particular, in the long 
run. The researchers added that corporate social performance (CSP) is 
particularly promising to consider when addressing the issue of 
corporate financial performance (CFP) for two reasons. First, the 
number of socially responsible (SR) investors and their amount of 
money invested has been ever-increasing over the last decades 
through $3.74 trillion assets under management in the United States 
(US SIF, 2012) and $13.57 trillion world-wide (GSIA, 2013) in 2012. 
There are profit and non-profit motives for corporate social 
responsibility from the viewpoint of SR investors (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009). Even if the latter could be based on the possibly 
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incorrect assumption of doing well while doing good (Derwall, Koedijk, 
and Horst, 2011). Second, corporate social responsibility is often 
claimed to be an issue of sustainability. Thus a long-term perspective 
is very apt in revealing the benefits of this kind of a company's effort 
(Peiris and Evans, 2010) 
 
First of all is the upsurges transparency around the social and 
environmental impact of companies, and their governance structure 
and secondly, it may possibly change the internal control system that 
further progresses the compliance with regulations and the reliability 
of reporting (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011). Consequently, the 
increased accessibility and quality of data about the firm lessens the 
informational asymmetry between the corporation and investors (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011), leading to lower capital constrictions (Hubbard, 
1998) in Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011). In summation, due to 
lower agency costs through stakeholder engagement and increased 
transparency through CSR reporting, Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2011) hypothesize that an establishment with superior CSR 
performance will face lower capital constraints. 
 
A Meta-analyses finding by Orlitzky et al. (2003) and Margolis et al. 
(2007), which aggregate results of a range of management studies, 
finds a significant positive relationship between Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP).  
On top of that, study by Evans and Peiris (2010) using a multifactor 
framework, delivers substantiation of a significant positive relationship 
between particular ESG rating criteria and both return on assets and 
market to book value measures, supporting the stakeholder theory 
that Corporate Social Performance (CSP) is positive for Corporate 
Financial Performance (CFP). 
 
Whilst analysis in Evans and Peiris (2010) study supported previous 
research by Brammer et al. (2006) and Galema et al. (2008) in relation 
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to the lack of a significant relationship between stakeholder ratings 
and stock return, a evidently positive relationship is found between 
total ESG rating and operating performance, henceforth supporting the 
stakeholder based explanation of CSP being a measure of effective 
management and being positive for CFP. Furthermore, a significant 
positive association is also found between broader ESG factors and 
company valuations signifying that higher rated companies are 
connected with higher earnings multiples (Evans and Peiris, 2010). 
Findings also propose that employment state of affairs are a more 
significant influence than other stakeholder criteria and a company’s 
involvement in more broad-spectrum non-stakeholder related social 
issues commonly contributes negatively to both underlying operating 
performance and stock return. Therefore, the analysis acclaims that 
ESG factors do impact corporate financial performance and hence are a 
relevant deliberation for investment decision-makers. 
 
In addition, Rees (2011) outcomes in the study of investor influence on 
firms’ environmental, social and governance performance suggest that 
pension fund based block holdings have a negative effect on 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) the result is based on a small 
sample of firms and the impact will be modest. The results of the 
block-holdings held by financial institutions are uneven. In contrast, 
the results of conventional linear regression models with those from 
propensity score matching experimental techniques, Rees (2011) 
findings also add to the refinement of experimental techniques. In five 
cases, for leverage, corporate cross-holdings, employee/family 
holdings, government holdings and pension fund block holdings, the 
results are broadly similar whether based on regression models or 
propensity score matching Rees (2011). 
 
Above and beyond, Nagy, Cogan and Sinnreich (2013) in their study 
mentioned that two reports by Mercer (2009) found that 20 of 36 peer-
reviewed studies showed evidence of a positive relationship between 
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ESG factors and financial performance, while five showed mixed 
results and eight showed a neutral relationship. Three others found 
negative results. A recent Deutsche Bank study by Fulton, Kahn and 
Sharples (2012), of 56 peer-reviewed papers found that 89 percent 
linked consideration of ESG factors with market-based 
outperformance, and that application of exclusionary SRI screens was 
responsible for any negative results. These findings support an 
evolving view of ESG investing strategies. 
 
2.3 Governance with company performance 
Corporate Governance (CG) is defined as an intricate of structures, 
processes, cultures and systems which excite a successful progress of 
the company Keasley, Thompson and Wright (1997). Deakin (2012) 
said that corporate governance is about the approach of how 
organizations are directed and controlled. New developments in 
corporate governance can be seen, according to Kay and Silberston 
(1999) in Kocmanova and Simberova (2012), in a single common goal, 
which is to give the executive management the utmost possible 
autonomy to develop long-term business in any way that seems 
applicable once they will have exactly specified the responsibilities to 
all stakeholders involved in this business for their long-term 
performance. In Dorfleitner et al. (2013) stated that normally, 
according to UNEP Finance Initiative and UN Global Compact (2013) 
the governance score measures several aspects of proper behaviour 
concerning the board of directors as well as about the integration of 
financial and non-financial goals of the company and shareholder 
rights. 
 
Corporate governance is the vital component in improving economic 
efficiency and growth, along with enhancing investors' confidence. It 
encompasses a set of associations between the company's 
management, its board of directors, its shareholders, and its 
stakeholders (Kocmanova and Simberova, 2012).  
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ECCE (2007a) in Bassen and Kovacs (2008) highlighted that financial 
analysts consider corporate governance issues to constitute a classic 
examination area within corporate valuation, whereas issues such as 
social or environmental impact experience incremental consideration. 
This situation could be attributed to the historically determined higher 
regulatory agenda regarding corporate governance matters as 
opposed to the more recently acknowledged the impact of social and 
environmental aspects by investment professionals (Bassen and 
Kovacs, 2008). 
 
In some region around the world, there has been growth in the 
implementation of government regulations that focus on creating 
greater disclosure around ESG issues (Smith, 2011). The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in the United 
States in July 2010, is among a broad range of regulations that will 
have direct effects on the financial industry there (Smith, 2011).  
 
Galbreath (2013) study found that there is evidence to suggest that 
institutional pressure to respond to ESG issues is higher in some 
industries in Australia than others. For example, recently, a carbon tax 
was introduced by the lower house of Parliament, becoming a law 
shortly thereafter. In general, the carbon-pricing scheme will impact 
those industries that are large carbon polluters (e.g., energy, 
transportation, oil, and gas) more than others (Maher 2012). 
 
Kocmanova and Simberova (2012) in their study found that extensive 
surveys of British and American corporations directed in the late 1990s 
display that the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and its financial performance is neither clear-cut nor 
systematic (Kakabatse, Kakabatse and Kouzmin, 2001). Conversely, 
loads of new research has surfaced, documenting the fact that the 
relation between the quality of corporate governance and performance 
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indicators actually does exist (Bradley, 2004). It was stated by Maly, 
Theodor and Peklo, 2002) that the proposition of positive correlation 
between the quality of governance and the achievement of a business 
as evidenced by a rising value for the shareholders has been confirmed 
by a number of empirical analyses. 
 
Gompers, Ishill and Metrick (2003) supported by Core, Guay, and 
Rusticus (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) provide evidence on the 
fact that weak governance leads to weak operating performance, but 
not automatically weak stock returns as the market partly seems to be 
able to price governance aspects. Dorfleitner et al. (2013) mentioned 
that a high CSP with respect to governance often yields an additional 
value which can be explained by the fact that many governance 
aspects are directly in favour of the shareholders, as conflicting to the 
remainder of the stakeholders. It can also be expected that more 
ability within the markets to price this aspect correctly when compared 
to the other dimensions, even if the value creation may work more 
directly (Dorfleitner et al., 2013). 
 
According to Gompers et al, (2003) and also mentioned in Kocmanova 
and Simberova (2012), the supremacy of sharing relationship between 
investors and managers is well-defined by the rules of corporate 
governance. Through the listing of 24 governance rules, they 
constructed a "Governance Index" reflecting the level of shareholders' 
rights in about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. Gompers et al, 
(2003) evaluated the empirical affiliation of this index with corporate 
performance and determined that corporate governance show a 
relationship strongly with stock returns during the 1990s. The 
corporations with sturdier shareholder rights had a higher value, 
profits, and higher growth in sales, lower capital expenditures, and 
made lesser corporate acquisitions. If the 11.4 % point difference 
incorporation value was even partially "caused" by each supplementary 
governance provision, then the long-term benefits of eradicating 
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numerous provisions would be enormous (Kocmanova and Simberova 
(2012). 
 
Hayashi (2013) point out that Guyatt (2006) conducted a questionnaire 
survey of ESG investors and found that more than 80% of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that good corporate governance and good 
corporate responsibility will bring long-term value and therefore long-
run investment returns 
 
Based on research done by Dorfleitner et al., (2013), it was found that 
on the fact that European and North American stock portfolios with 
high E, S, and G scores show a significant financial outperformance in 
the long run with the exception of the combination of governance and 
Europe. Investing in the top stocks and shorting those with low E, S, G 
scores implies even higher abnormal returns for the investor 
(Dorfleitner et al., 2013). Therefore, Dorfleitner et al. (2013) conclude 
that in the conforming countries, activities of firms to increase their E, 
S, or G score are long-term investments, which are not priced by the 
market before they lead to tangible outcomes. 
 
Dorfleitner et al. (2013) added that, for the G score there are 
significant positive abnormal returns, their absolute value is much 
smaller than the significant figures of the European and North 
American portfolios. For the E and S score, no five-year abnormal 
return is significant while in some shorter holding periods there are 
small positive or negative returns (Dorfleitner et al., 2013). In the Asia 
Pacific region, researcher observe a significant positive long-run 
abnormal return only regarding the S score, while for E and G the 
outperformance is significantly negative (Dorfleitner et al., 2013). 
Besides that, corporate governance research by Gompers et al. (2003) 
and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) found indication that higher levels of 
governance leading to significantly higher returns, valuation 
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(e.g.,price-to-book ratios), and operating performance when measured 
by a net profit margin and sales growth. 
 
Dorfleitner et al. (2013) in their study stated that Barber (2006) utilizes 
the Carhart (1997) model to contemplate the implication of 
governance factors in the context of institutional activism, finding 
evidence of a positive alpha for a portfolio of stocks targeted by 
Calpers (as part of their active engagement with company 
management) over the period 1992-1995. On top of that, Barber 
(2006) also founds alphas are not significantly different from zero (due 
to the effect of high standard errors). 
 
Rees (2011) in his study, using a range of estimation techniques the 
results robustly suggest that government block-holdings and higher 
levels of debt are positively associated with environmental, social and 
governance performance. The results are also strongly consistent with 
entrenched equity holders, be they employees/family or corporate 
cross-holdings, being negatively associated with scores (Rees, 2011).  
  
Furthermore, Rees (2011) also mentioned that conventional agency 
theory suggests that the separation of ownership from control or the 
exploitation of minority shareholdings by entrenched blocks will lead 
to sub-optimal performance where optimal is assumed to be wealth 
maximisation. Mackenzie and Rees (2011) also analyse investor 
characteristics and conclude that entrenched undiversified owners 
resist ESG investment and tentatively suggest that leverage is 
positively associated with ESG scores. 
 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review 
Previous Research Author and Year 
There is generally a positive relationship between 
environmental aspect and firm value. 
Semenova and Hassel 
(2008) 
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The market seems to completely acknowledge the financial 
benefits of eco-efficiency only with a delay 
Guenster, Bauer, 
Derwall, and Koedijk 
(2011) 
In the environmental dimension, it is argued that firms with 
a high Corporate Social Performance (CSP) are prepared in a 
better way if regulatory changes are implemented and the 
company may profit from a better reputation. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) can also be 
influenced positively through treating the employees as 
stakeholders well, who in turn will perform better in their 
jobs. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
ESG rating (for diversity, environmental standards, and 
product) has a significant negative (positive) effect on 
book-to-market (market-to-book) ratios, pointing to a link 
with stock return.  
Galema, Platinga, and 
Scholtens (2008) 
Return outperformance is not significant for stocks 
screened on strength and distress scores for several 
Domini Social Index (DSI) ratings criteria 
Galema et al. (2008) 
Higher environmental and community relations correspond 
to lower returns, while employment ratings are positively 
related to returns, although not significantly so. 
Brammer, Brooks and 
Pavelin (2006) 
The social performance of a corporation is a key factor of 
the company performance also in the framework of ESG 
performance indicators. 
Kocmanova and 
Simberova (2012). 
For Europe and North America a high CSP leads to positive 
or zero abnormal returns over short investment horizons 
and is rewarded in the long run for all three dimensions 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
For Japan and for the Asia Pacific region, only the 
governance dimension and the social dimension 
respectively yield positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs), while the corresponding other dimensions show 
negative or insignificant BHARs 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
A high CSP can save money and yield high (unexpected by 
the market) cash flows in future periods. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
There is a positive significant relationship between CSP and 
CFP 
Konar and Cohen 
(2001) 
There is negative relationships of CSP on CFP Boyle, Higgins and 
Rhee (1997) 
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There is no conclusive relationship o CSP on CFP Hillman and Keim 
(2001) 
A positive CSP lowers the equity and debt cost of capital of 
a company, which obviously also creates value. 
 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
Organizations with superior CSR performance are better 
positioned to acquire financing in the capital markets 
Cheng, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2011) 
Firms that engross in CSR activities face lower capital 
constrictions, thus identifying tangible firm features that 
are allied to the capital constraints a firm faces. 
Cheng, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2011) 
Companies with high CSR scores have lower idiosyncratic 
risk 
Lee and Faff (2009) 
Establishments with low CSR scores are more to be 
expected to experience financial distress 
Goss (2009) 
There is positive effect of CSR on sell-side analysts’’ 
recommendations 
Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2010) 
Corporations with the worst CSR scores pay between 7 and 
18 basis points more on their bank debt compared to 
corporations with greater scores. 
Goss and Roberts 
(2011) 
The voluntary disclosure of CSR undertakings leads to a 
reduction in the firms cost of capital, while attracting 
devoted institutional investors and analyst coverage 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
and Yang (2011) 
Firms with better CSR scores exhibit lower cost of equity 
capital. 
 
El Ghoul, Guedhami, 
Kwok and Mishra 
(2011) 
There is lack of consistency in the relationship between ESG 
ratings and stock return. 
Peiris and Evans 
(2010),  Brammer et 
al. (2006) and Galema 
et al. (2008) 
There is positive relationship between a firm's stakeholder-
related ESG ratings and its operating performance and 
market valuation, implying higher earnings expectations for 
higher-rated stocks 
Peiris and Evans 
(2010) 
Broader ESG factors do potentially influence a company's 
financial performance and are a relevant consideration for 
investment decision-makers. 
Peiris and Evans 
(2010) 
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Greater CSR performance is linked to better stakeholder 
commitment, restraining the possibility of short-term 
opportunistic behavior and as a result decreasing the whole 
contracting costs. 
Cheng, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2011) 
There is a significant positive relationship between 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial 
Performance (CFP). 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
and Margolis et al. 
(2007) 
There is a significant positive relationship between 
particular ESG rating criteria and both return on assets and 
market to book value measures, supporting the stakeholder 
theory that Corporate Social Performance (CSP) is positive 
for Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). 
 
Evans and Peiris 
(2010) 
Employment settings are a more relevant influence than 
other stakeholder criteria and a company’s involvement in 
more general non-stakeholder related social issues 
contributes negatively to both operating performance and 
stock return 
Evans and Peiris 
(2010). 
The relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and its financial performance is neither clear-
cut nor systematic 
Kakabatse, Kakabatse 
and Kouzmin (2001) 
The relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and performance indicators actually does exists 
Bradley (2004) 
Proposition of positive correlation between the quality of 
governance and the achievement of a business as 
evidenced by a rising value for the shareholders has been 
confirmed by a number of empirical analyses 
Maly, Theodor and 
Peklo (2002) 
Weak governance leads to weak operating performance, but 
not automatically weak stock returns as the market partly 
seems to be able to price governance aspects 
Gompers, Ishill and 
Metrick (2003) ,Core, 
Guay, and Rusticus 
(2006) and Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) 
A high CSP with respect to governance often yields an 
additional value which can be explained by the fact that 
many governance aspects are directly in favor of the 
shareholders, as conflicting to the remainder of the 
stakeholders. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
Corporate governance show a relationship strongly with 
stock returns during the 1990s 
Gompers et al, (2003) 
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Good corporate governance and good corporate 
responsibility will bring long-term value and therefore long-
run investment returns 
 
Guyatt (2006) 
 
Stock portfolios with high E, S, and G scores show a 
significant financial outperformance in the long run with 
the exception of the combination of governance and 
Europe. 
Dorfleitner et al. 
(2013) 
Higher levels of governance leading to significantly higher 
returns, valuation (e.g.,price-to-book ratios), and operating 
performance when measured by a net profit margin and 
sales growth. 
Gompers et al. (2003) 
and Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) 
Government block-holdings and higher levels of debt are 
positively associated with environmental, social and 
governance performance 
Rees (2011). 
Leverage is positively associated with ESG scores. 
 
Mackenzie and Rees 
(2011) 
20 of 36 peer-reviewed studies showed evidence of a 
positive relationship between ESG factors and financial 
performance, while five showed mixed results and eight 
showed a neutral relationship. Three others found negative 
results 
Mercer (2009) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3. Introduction 
This chapter will discuss about the research methodology and how the 
data were obtained. For the purpose of this study, there are several tasks 
had been done and first of all is on how research design has been 
developed. This chapter consists of data collection method and 
framework. It also exposed on how the measurement has been done and 
lastly is the proposed of data analysis. 
This study seeks to critically evaluate whether the environmental, 
social governance (ESG) performance plays the important role in the 
profitability of the institution or not. Furthermore, this paper also wants 
to investigate the relationship between the environmental, social, score 
(ESG) performance and the ownership of the company. In order to achieve 
these objectives, two models will be tested and discussed later.  
 
 
3.1. Specification of the Model 
Basically, model specification mentions to the purpose of which 
explanatory variables should include in or excluded from a regression 
equation  (Patrick, 1997). Generally, the specification of a regression 
model should be constructed mainly on theoretical thoughts rather than 
empirical or methodological.  
 
In this research, the researcher applied positivist paradigm or in other 
word is a quantitative method because the researcher wanted to check 
the validity of finding in a new context. Mostly, the previous research 
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used different aspects such as a sources of main data, theoretical 
framework, the length of time period study and countries. Furthermore, 
the study wanted to ensure the validity of finding or concepts with the 
previous research and it is not surprising if the result might be different 
with this study due to these different aspects. 
 
There has two theoretical framework or model for this study. The first 
and second theoretical framework as shown in Figure 3.1 (a) and (b), 
respectively. 
 
 
 
There have four equations for the first model, to ensure the validity of 
the result after the regression takes place. This model was tested for 
answering the first research question which is, “The performance of a 
company that declared in the annual report, are they subjective with 
changing of ESG, while the sales and leverage remain the same?”. The 
model has been tested in a number of different provisions.  
 
 
  
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Figure 3.1 (a)  First Model: Company Performances and ESG 
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The second model was applied to answer the second research question, 
“Is there any impact on environmental, social, governance (ESG) if there 
any changes in component of an ownership?”.  
 
3.2. Statement Of Hypothesis 
A hypothesis is a proposition statement that is shown in testable form and tries 
to measure a relationship between dependent and independent variables. Some 
statement created in the hypothesis can be either supported or rejected 
through research. There are two types of hypothesis which is null (negative) and 
alternate (positive) hypothesis.  
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Figure 1.1 (b)  Second Model: ESG and Ownership 
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Since the objectives of this paper; 1) seek to critically evaluate whether the 
environmental, social governance (ESG) performance plays the important role in 
the profitability of the institution or not, 2) investigate the relationship between 
the ownership of the company and the environmental, social, score (ESG) 
performance, the study creates a set of testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1(a): 
H0 : There is no significant link between return on equity and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H1
 
: There is a significant link between return on equity and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): 
H0
 
: There is no significant link between return on asset and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H1
 
: There is a significant link between return on asset and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
 
Hypothesis 1(c): 
H0
 
: There is no significant link between pretax margin and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H1
 
: There is a significant link between pretax margin and environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) 
 
Hypothesis 1(d): 
H0 : There is no significant link between price to book ratio and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H1 : There is a significant link between price to book ratio and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
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Hypothesis 2 (a): 
H0 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the pension fund  
H1 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the pension fund 
 
Hypothesis 2 (b): 
H0 : There is no link relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the government 
H1 : There is a significant link between environmental, social, governance 
(ESG) and the government 
 
Hypothesis 2 (c): 
H0 : There is no significant link between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the investment advisor 
H1 : There is a significant link between environmental, social, governance 
(ESG) and the investment advisor 
 
Hypothesis 2 (d): 
H0 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the private equity 
H1 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the private equity 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 (e): 
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H0 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and unclassified 
H1 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the classified 
 
Hypothesis 2 (f): 
H0 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the hedge fund 
H1 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the hedge fund 
 
Hypothesis 2  (g): 
H0 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the others 
H1 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the others 
 
 
3.3. Validity and Reliability  
“An item, sample or instrument measures or describes what it is 
supposed to measure or describe” (Bell,J, 2005, p117), can be called as 
validity. It can be divided into two which are external or internal. For 
internal validity can be referred to “to the extent to which the stated 
interpretation of the result is true” (Anderson J, 2000); while external 
validity is to simplifying sample results to the whole population. 
 
The word of reliability, in study, denotes to “the extent to which a test or 
procedure produces similar results under constant conditions on all 
occasions” (Bell, 2005). In the other ways to understand, this denotes to 
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the consistency in measurement.  
 
 
3.4.  Technique for Data Analysis 
3.4.1. Multiple Linear Regression Model 
The method used in the study is the Multiple Linear Regression Model. 
This method of analysis is designed to determine the simultaneous 
effects of the ESG score on the performance of companies and also to 
see the relationship between ESG and the component of ownership of 
the company.  
 
Yit = β0it + β1itX1it + β2itX2it + β3itX3it + µ 
 
Based on the equation above, Y
it
  is the effect on ESG scores for a 
certain company and period of time either they get greater profitability 
or suffer losses. β
1it
 is the reaction coefficient  measuring the impact, 
in other words, it can be explained by the value of changes on Y
it
 if 
there any increase or decrease in X
1it
 plus the value of      , though µ is 
error term which disturbance of the model. Below are the following 
multiple regressions that have been used in this study:  
 
      
                               )                
              ) 
   
      
                              )                
              ) 
 
       
                              )                
              ) 
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                                   )                
              ) 
 
                                                        
                              ) 
 
The equation 1(a) to 1(d) is to show how strength the 
relationship between company performance and ESG even using 
different measurement for company performance. Indirectly, it 
will increase the reliability and validity of this study. Meanwhile, 
the equation 2 is to identify whether ownership the company is 
significant or not an ESG, if yes, which components that give 
high impact.  
 
Eviews one of the popular software used by the researcher to run 
a regression, same as well as my study to examine the value of 
the coefficient either it is positive or negative. The data were 
combined between time series and panel procedures and for the 
panel data, there consists of two methods which are fixed effect 
or random effect. In order to identify which final is valid to be 
used in this study, two tests had been used, which are: 
 
 Likelihood Test 
It is also known as Redundant Fixed Effect Test. This test 
used to analyse whether the regression result should used 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method or not. The null 
hypothesis for this test is accepted the Ordinary Least 
Square method, while the alternative hypothesis do not 
accept Ordinary Least Square method. If the result is 
rejected the null hypothesis, then another will be used 
which is Hausman Test. 
 
 Hausman Test 
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It is also known as Correlated Random Effect Test. This 
test used when the null hypothesis was rejected in 
Likelihood Test to confirm either random or fixed effect 
will be used in regression analysis. The null hypothesis for 
this test is accept random effect, while the alternative 
hypothesis do not accept random effect, thus the fixed 
effect will be used. 
 
3.4.2. Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
It is the test of goodness of fit. It is used to determine how well the 
regression line fits the data. The proportion of total variation in the 
dependent variable is denoted as R² and the value is ranging between 
0 to 1. The higher the value of R², the highest explanatory power of 
the estimated equation and it is more accurate for forecasting 
purposes. It determines how well that all the regression line fits the 
data. In other words, the value of R² is explained that how significant 
the explanatory variable influence the dependent variable. If R² show 
the value of 1, it indicates that all the changes in dependent variable 
used. It shows that there is a strong correlation between dependent 
and independent variables, but if the R² show the value of 0, it 
indicates that the changes of the variation independent variable do not 
explain by the independent variables. 
 
rp = αp + βp * rindex 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3. Individual Testing (T  Test) 
T-test analysis is the formula a for a test statistic that either 
exactly follows or closely approximately a t-distribution under 
the null hypothesis is given. Each of these statistics can be used 
ESG in Focus 
 
U1249714 Page 49 
 
to carry out either a one-tailed or two-tailed test. The null 
hypothesis between independent and dependent variable (H
0
 : β
1
 
= 0) is tested against the alternative hypothesis (H
1 
: β
1
 ≠ 0) by 
using the t - test approach. 
 
 
3.4.4. Overall or Joint Testing (F  Test) 
It is also the test of the overall explanatory power of regression. It 
analyses the variance; this uses the F-statistics or F-ratio. The F-
statistic is used to test various statistical hypotheses about the mean 
of the distribution from which a sample or a set of sample has been 
drawn. If the calculated F-value is higher, it shows there is a significant 
outcome among the explanatory and dependent variables. 
 
F = S1² 
      S2² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
  
4. Introduction 
This study has been mentioned earlier is about the link between 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) and dependent variable, 
company performance, where performance of a company being 
measured and comprises both accounting and market performance, and 
is denoted by profitability ratios, containing of three measures, and one 
measure for equity valuation  (Balatbat, 2012).  This chapter will explain 
about overall of empirical study by using the methodology that has been 
mentioned before. The analysis and findings of empirical study can be 
obtained by using the Eviews 7.   
 
4.1. Data Collection and Sample Period 
Data collection can be defined as how the researcher collects the data 
also related with nature of data to be gathered. Under this section also, 
there will be discussed further in population and sample. 
The main data used in this research was acquired from Bloomberg 
Terminal in yearly basis to produce quantitative analysis, while for 
supporting data were taken from web sites, journals and previous reports 
relating to this study focus, and it's called as secondary data. Bloomberg 
Terminal was chosen as the method to gather the environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) data because there has only a small number of research 
from previous researcher used it. Mostly, the researchers used 
FTSE4Good, Asset4, Goldman Sachs, KLD dataset or Dow Jones 
Sustainability World Index (Galbreath, 2013). “Bloomberg collects more 
than 100 data points related to ESG. For each company, Bloomberg 
calculates a score that ranges from 1 for companies that disclose the 
minimum number of data points to 100 for those that disclose every data 
point collected and incorporated into the scoring model by Bloomberg”, 
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(Bloomberg, 2011, p. 12). Besides, to ensure it is appropriate for 
corporate in a different industry sector, the score is designed for 
achieving this aim.  
The range of period covered by the research starting from year 2009 to 
2012, which is four years for the first model and only one year, 2012 for 
the second model and it covers five countries which are United Kingdom, 
France and Germany from developed countries and the other two are 
China and Malaysia from developing countries
1
. The reason for limiting 
this range of period was that the latest data for the research was 
obtainable. Furthermore, to ensure  no bias and increase the validity of 
the result, the data was standardised in Great Britain Pound Sterling 
currency because the currency is one of the strongest currencies in the 
world. Hence, this paper used the panel data because there has 
combination of time-series and cross-section data for analysing the first 
research question which is, “The performance of a company that 
declared in the annual report, are they subjective with changing of ESG, 
while the sales and leverage remain the same?”. Meanwhile, in answering 
the second research question which is, “Is there any impact on 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) if there any changes in 
component of  an ownership?”, cross-section data will be used.  
Population discusses to a whole group of people, events, or things of 
interest that the researcher demands to study. Selecting a partial of the 
population is known as sampling and there have various techniques; 
random, systematic, stratified, convenience, judgement, quota and 
snowball sampling. A portion of the population can be called as a 
sample. The purpose of using the sample, general conclusions can be 
created by the researcher for a whole population concern. The population 
for my study includes all listed companies  from five countries which are 
United Kingdom, Germany and France represent for developed countries; 
while China and Malaysia for developing countries is 500 companies.  On 
                                                            
1 Please refer Appendix for list of Developed and Developing countries 
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the other hand, the sample of my study consisted only 306 companies 
have taken randomly after the companies fulfilled some requirement 
such as the company should be listed during the period of this study; 
Year 2009 to Year 2012 or not to be delisting during that period and 
there has not too much of missing data. It also to reduce sample error, 
as well as increase the internal validity. 
 
4.2.  Variable Definition 
 Return on Equity (ROE):  
The amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders' 
equity. Return on equity measures a corporation's profitability by 
revealing how much profit a company generates with the money 
shareholders have invested. The ROE is useful for comparing the 
profitability of a company to that of other firms in the same industry. 
= Net Income/Shareholder's Equity2 
 
 Return on Asset (ROA):  
An indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total 
assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using 
its assets to generate earnings. Sometimes this is referred to as 
"return on investment". The assets of the company are comprised of 
both debt and equity. Both of these types of financing are used to 
fund the operations of the company. The ROA figure gives investors 
an idea of how effectively the company is converting the money it has 
to invest in net income. The higher the ROA number, the better, 
because the company is earning more money on less investment. 
 
3
 
 
                                                            
2 Investopedia Website 
3 Investopedia Website 
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 Pretax Margin (PTMR) 
A company's earnings before tax as a percentage of total sales or revenues. 
The higher the pre-tax profit margin, the more profitable the company. The 
trend of the pretax profit margin is as important as the figure itself, since it 
provides an indication of which way the company's profitability is headed.
4
 
 
 Price to Book Ratio (PB) 
A ratio used to compare a stock's market value to its book value. Also 
known as the "price-equity ratio". A lower P/B ratio could mean that the 
stock is undervalued. However, it could also mean that something is 
fundamentally wrong with the company.
5
 
= CURRENT PRICE/ BOOK VALUE PER SHARE 
 
 Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) 
“Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. The score 
ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of 
ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by 
Bloomberg”, (Bloomberg, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.  Descriptive Analysis 
4.3.1. Model 1: Company Performance and ESG 
                                                            
4 Investopedia Website 
5 Investopedia Website 
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Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ESG 0.329796 0.723140 0.090909 0.159462 
ROE 0.098944 3.148787 -0.951689 0.367274 
ROA 0.055058 0.529492 -0.121178 0.061600 
PTMR 15.85658 277.1499 -123.3111 22.00396 
PB 3.497902 157.3917 0.272100 6.412314 
SALES 14935.99 294786.4 6.888200 32414.47 
LEVERAGE 24.64759 73.54960 0.000000 15.79870 
Table 4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for First Model 
 
From the Table 4.3.1 above,  the range value of ESG is between 
1% to 72%. It means that the minimum ESG score from the 
sample is 1%, which can be explained by the company disclosed 
the minimum data while the maximum ESG score is around 72% 
of disclosed data. The gap between minimum and maximum is 
big and it is good for this research to see the impact of ESG 
score disclosure towards on the company performance and it 
has a variety of data. Roughly, most of the companies have 
around 33% of data disclosure. The risk of the companies does 
not disclose the data is around 16%. It might be certain data is 
private of confidential or company policy.  
The average of equity return for this study is 9.9%, which 
explained that roughly 9.9% of the profit will be generated from 
the 1% of shareholders’ investment. The maximum value of 
equity return will be produced by the shareholders’ investment 
is almost 315%, while the minimum value is -95%. The risk that 
shareholders have to face not earn profit from their investment 
is around 36.7%. This level of risk is categorized as low risk and 
the shareholders are risk taker because they are willing to bear 
the losses.  
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The mean of an asset's return is 5.5%, it shows that from the 1% 
of the assets, the company can generate 5.5% of the profit. The 
range of an asset’s return is between -12% to 53%, it means that 
the company can face the loss of 12% or generate the profit until 
53% from the total assets. The return of assets as a 
measurement how efficient the managers of the company 
managed their total assets, so from this result, we can say that 
the managers quite good at managing their assets because the 
higher return on assets, the better management, the company is 
producing extra money for a small investment. Furthermore,  
they only faced 6.2% of risk not getting any income from their 
assets.  
Mostly the companies from this study has around 15.86% pretax 
margin. The range of minimum and maximum value for pretax 
margin is around -123.31% to 277.15%. It shows that some of 
the companies well performed and some are not. Even they are 
from different countries, this pretax margin still reliable to use 
because the pretax margin is before the deduction of the 
country tax since the tax is might be different. The risk that they 
have to face not getting any profit is 22%.  
The most interesting part of this descriptive statistic is the range 
of leverage is between 0% to 73.54%. It shows that there has one 
of the company do not use debt in their business. While the 
average leverage is only around 25%. It is good for the company 
when the level of leverage is not too high because it will give 
higher risk to the company if they cannot well manage their 
debts.  
 
4.3.2. Model 2: ESG and Company Ownership 
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Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ESG 0.340175 0.714286 0.099174 0.151853 
PNSNFN 2.3213 12.463 0 2.036461 
GOV 7.374637 76.286 0.054 9.651897 
INV 44.21823 99.391 0.016 32.05483 
PVTEQT 0.360878 5.403 0.001 1.17275 
UNCLASSIFIED 4.248649 68.109 0 8.516764 
HDFN 0.966827 12.527 0 1.787797 
OTHER 6.541726 59.647 0 10.75659 
Table 4.3.2  Descriptive Statistics for Second Model 
 
For the second model, there does not have extreme value. For 
pension fund and hedge fund, the range of minimum and 
maximum value is ranging from 0 to 12.6. The ownership of the 
company mostly from investment advisor which is around 44.22, 
while the lowest contribution for ownership is private equity, 
only 0.36. This can explain that mostly the ownership of the 
firms in this study was contributed from investment advisor 
which also known as a financial advisor, the person that make 
any recommendation for investment.  
 
4.4.  Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is basically used to measure the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. From the regression 
below, the Hypothesis Testing for Individual, Joint Hypothesis Testing 
for overall, and the Goodness of Fit Test will be seen, but before we 
finalised the result, we have tested the four equations in first model 
using Likelihood and Hausman Test.  
 
 
4.4.1. Likelihood Test 
4.4.1.1. First Equation 
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Here is the first equation has to be tested, which is the 
relationship between equity return or return on equity (ROE) and 
ESG. From the probability, we can say that the null hypothesis is 
rejected because the value of probability of Period F is 0.00% less 
than 10% significance level, so it means that we rejected OLS. 
After knowing this result, the regression will be tested using 
Hausman Test to verify whether it should be appropriate to use 
fixed or random effect or random analysis.  
 
4.4.1.2. Second Equation 
 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Period F 3.676386 (3,1181) 0.0118 
Period Chi-square 11.043046 3 0.0115 
Table 4.4.1.2 Likelihood Test for Second Equation 
Next is the second equation need to be tested, which is the 
relationship between return on asset (ROA) and ESG. The result 
showed that the probability for Period  is 1.18%, which less than 
10% of significance level, therefore we can reject the null 
hypothesis or in other words we reject the OLS. Consequently, we 
have to do next test which is Hausman Test. 
 
4.4.1.3. Third Equation 
 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Period F 57.950031 (3,893) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 160.091249 3 0.0000 
Table 4.4.1.1 Likelihood Test for First Equation 
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Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Period F 2.491694 (3,1181) 0.0587 
Period Chi-square 7.495691 3 0.0577 
Table 4.4.1.3  Likelihood Test for Third Equation 
 
The third equation has been tested, which is the relationship 
between pretax margin (PTMR) and ESG. The result still same as 
the previous equation, OLS has been rejected due to the null 
hypothesis, not accepted, as the probability is less than 10% of 
significance level (5.87% < 10%). Therefore, the Hausman Test has 
to be tested on this regression to identify whether fixed or 
random effect will be used in this regression. 
 
4.4.1.4. Fourth Equation 
 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Period F 1.863704 (3,1178) 0.1339 
Period Chi-square 5.611032 3 0.1321 
Table 4.4.1.4  Likelihood Test for Fourth Equation 
 
The last equation need to be tested, which is the relationship 
between price to book ratio (PB) and ESG. Contrary to previous 
equations, the probability for Period F is 13.39%, which is more 
than 10% of significance level. We can conclude that this equation 
will be used OLS since the null hypothesis has been accepted and 
no need to be verified by using Hausmant Test. The data can only 
be pooled together and OLS employed. 
 
4.4.2. Hausman Test 
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4.4.2.1. First Equation 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Period random 173.850076 3 0.0000 
Table 4.4.2.1  Hausman Test for First Equation 
 
This is the result of Hausmant Test for the firs equation; the 
relationship between return on equity (ROE) and ESG. It showed 
that the probability is 0.00%, which less than 10% of significance 
level, therefore the null hypothesis has been rejected. When this 
situation occurred, the regression most appropriate to use the 
fixed effect for period since we rejected the random effect. 
 
4.4.2.2. Second Equation 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Period random 11.029159 3 0.0116 
Table 4.4.2.2  Hausman Test for Second Equation 
 
For the second regression, the result of the relationship between 
return on assets (ROA) and ESG explained that the probability is 
less than 10% of significance level  (1.16% < 10%). In conclusion, 
we rejected the null hypothesis which means we rejected random 
effect. Hence, we also used the fixed effect for period in this 
regression. 
 
4.4.2.3. Third Equation 
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Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Period random 7.475082 3 0.0582 
Table 4.4.2.3  Hausman Test for Third Equation 
 
The last Hausman Test is between the pretax margin (PTMR) and 
ESG. The probability of this test is 5.82%, less than 10% of 
significance level. It means that, this test rejected the null 
hypothesis, directly rejected the random effect. In conclusion, the 
fixed effect for period will be used in regression analysis to see 
the effect of ESG towards on pretax margin.  
 
In summary, for equation one to three, there will be used fixed 
effect method for period in regression analysis, while in fourth 
equation, there will be used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. 
This is for increasing the validity of the result. 
 
4.4.3. Individual Testing (T-test) 
First of all, the hypothesis for individual is:- 
H0 : βi = 0 
H1 : βi  0 
i = ESG, LOG(SALES), LEVERAGE 
 
The individual testing is to see the individual effect the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable. The 
significance level in this study is 10%. If the probability for T-stat 
is less than significant level, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
or vice versa.  
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4.4.3.1. First Model 
The result for first equation; the relationship between 
return on equity and ESG as shown in Table 4.4.3.1 (a) It 
showed that all the probability of independent variables 
which are ESG, sales and leverage less than 10% of 
significance level. It means that all the null hypotheses has 
been rejected. Therefore, it is the significance or can affect 
the performance of the return on equity (ROE).   
 
Variables 
First Equation : ROE 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
(prob) 
Hypothesis 
Alpha (α) 
0.185707 0.0003 
- 
ESG 
0.190058 0.0596 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LOG(SALES) 
-0.013549 0.0954 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LEVERAGE 
-0.001789 0.0124 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
Table 4.4.3.1 (a)  Regression Result for First Model 
      
                   )                   )
                               ) 
 
The first equation above can be explained by: 
 ESG 
In this research, the p-value for ESG is 0.0596 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected, which means the ESG significance of equity 
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return (ROE) at the 10 % significance level. If the ESG increases by 
one per cent, the equity return of the company will increase by 
0.19 per cent.  
 
 Sales 
While the probability of sales is 0.0954. The null hypothesis is 
rejected at 10% of significance level, which explained that sales is 
negative significant with ROE. If the sales is decreased by one per 
cent, the profitability will increase by 0.0135 per cent. 
 
 Leverage  
The p-value of leverage in this research is 0.0124. It means the null 
hypothesis is rejected; therefore leverage is negative significant 
towards ROE at 10% significance level. It means that there has 
negative relationship between leverage and ROE, one per cent 
increase in leverage, 0.0018 per cent of ROE will decrease.  
 
 
The second equation above can be explained by: 
Variables 
Second Equation : ROA 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
(prob) 
Hypothesis 
Alpha (α) 0.121698 0.0000 - 
ESG 0.074062 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LOG(SALES) -0.009044 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LEVERAGE -0.000727 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
Table 4.4.3.1 (b) Regression Result for First Model 
      
                                     )
                               ) 
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 ESG 
In this research, the probability (t-stat) for ESG is 0.0000 and 
the null hypothesis is rejected, which means the ESG 
significance of return on assets (ROA) at the 10 % significance 
level. If the ESG increases by one per cent, the return on 
assets (ROA) of the company will increase by 0.0741 per cent.  
 
 Sales 
While the probability of sales is 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
is rejected at 10% of significance level, which explained that 
sales is negative significant with ROE. If the sales is 
decreased by one per cent, the profitability will increase by 
0.009 per cent.  
 
 Leverage  
The probability (t-stat) of leverage in this research is 0.0000. 
It means the null hypothesis is rejected; therefore leverage is 
negative significant towards ROA at 10% significance level. It 
means that there has negative relationship between leverage 
and ROA, one per cent increase in leverage, 0.0007 per cent 
of ROA will decrease.  
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Third Equation : PTMR 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
(prob) 
Hypothesis 
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Alpha (α) 41.86070 0.0000 - 
ESG 35.34619 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LOG(SALES) -4.300148 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LEVERAGE -0.129518 0.0008 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
Table 4.4.3.1 (c) Regression Result for First Model 
       
                                       )
                               ) 
 
The third equation above can be explained by: 
 ESG 
The probability (t-stat) for ESG is 0.0000 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected, which means the ESG significance of 
pretax margin (PTMR) at the 10 % significance level. If the ESG 
increases by one per cent, the pretax margin of the company 
will increase by 35.35 per cent.  
 
 Sales 
While the probability of sales is 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
is rejected at 10% of significance level, which explained that 
sales is negative significant with PTMR. If the sales is 
decreased by one per cent, the profitability will increase by 
4.3 per cent.  
 
 Leverage  
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The probability (t-stat) of leverage in this research is 0.0008. 
It means the null hypothesis is rejected; therefore leverage is 
negatively significant towards PTMR at 10% significance level. 
It means that there has negative relationship between 
leverage and PTMR, one per cent increase in leverage, 0.1295 
per cent of PTMR will be decreasing. 
 
Variables 
Forth Equation : PB 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
(prob) 
Hypothesis 
Alpha (α) 
8.547187 0.0000 
- 
ESG 
5.989743 0.0004 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LOG(SALES) 
-0.958941 0.0000 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
LEVERAGE 
0.027724 0.0179 
Reject null 
hypothesis 
Table 4.4.3.1 (d)  Regression Result for First Model 
 
                                           )                  
              ) 
 
The fourth equation above can be explained by: 
 ESG 
In this research, the probability (t-stat) for ESG is 0.0004 and 
the null hypothesis is rejected, which means the ESG 
significance of price to book ratio (PB) at the 10 % 
significance level. If the ESG increases by one per cent, the 
price to book ratio (PB) of the company will increase by 5.99  
per cent.  
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 Sales 
While the probability of sales is 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
is rejected at 10% of significance level, which explained that 
sales is negative significant with PB. If the sales is decreased 
by one per cent, the profitability will increase by 0.96 per 
cent.  
 
 Leverage  
The probability (t-stat) of leverage in this research is 0.0179. 
It means the null hypothesis is rejected; therefore leverage is 
negative significant towards PB at 10% significance level. It 
means that there has negative relationship between leverage 
and PB, one per cent increase in leverage, 0.028 per cent of 
PB will be decreasing. 
 
In conclusion, the result for this showed that there has positively 
significant between the performance of the companies; return on 
equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), pretax margin (PTMR) and 
price to book ratio (PB) and environmental, social governance 
(ESG). It explained that ESG disclosure will influence the 
performance of the companies. This indicates that the ESG 
disclosure is a positive indicator for return which could be linked 
to the corporate governance. This result was supported from 
previous study such as Mercer (2009), Gompers et al (2003), 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) state that higher lever of ESG will 
lead higher of return of the firms. Furthermore, in Evans and 
Peiris (2010) also found that significant positive relationship 
between ESG disclosure and firm performances; return on assets 
and market to book value. This finding backup the stakeholder 
theory which is Corporate Social Performance (CSP) direct 
relationship for Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) in 
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Orlitzky et al (2003) and Margolis et al. (2007) study. In addition, 
it will increase the potential investors in considering to make an 
investment when the ESG disclosure is higher.  
 
Leverage is negatively correlated to ROE, ROA, and PTMR except  
for PB, there has negative relationship. Firm’s performance can 
be affected if the value of leverage is too high when the 
investors are afraid to invest in the firm, thus the market price of 
the firm will be decreased. It is proven by the negative 
relationship between price book ratio (PB) and leverage. 
However, sometime high level of leverage is good when the 
firms want to expand their business and well managed by the 
manager. Indirectly, it also will increase the return on equity. 
 
The surprising result was found in this study when the sale has 
an indirect relationship with the firm’s performance. This result 
might be affected due to the data was used were from different 
countries. Besides, the period of the data is from Year 2009 to 
2012, there has recession occurred starting Year 2008 until 
2009 and Malaysia and UK were affected
6
. In addition, most of 
the previous studies were not used sales in their research as 
explanatory variables. They used the total asset in measuring the 
size of the companies. This reason might be why the sales were 
negative relationship with firm performance.  
 
 
4.4.3.2. Second Model 
                                                            
6 Further information about recession can visit this website : http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/14/global-
recession-2009-oped-cx_nr_0115roubini.html . There has other countries affected by recession but in this 
study was focus only in Malaysia and UK. 
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Variables 
Equation : ESG 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
(prob) 
Hypothesis 
Alpha (α) 
0.555383 0.0969 
- 
PNSNFN 
-0.138577 0.6901 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
GOV 
0.031849 0.5292 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
INV 
-0.004284 0.4140 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
PVTEQT 
4.334201 0.9286 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
UNSD 
0.057829 0.3841 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
HDFN 
-0.227135 0.5168 
Failed to reject the 
null hypothesis 
Table 4.4.3.2 Regression Result for Second Model 
 
 
                                                        
                              ) 
 
From the Table 4.4.3.2, we can say that the ownership has 
strongly not significant to ESG disclosure since the null 
hypothesis was failed to reject for all explanatory variables. 
Government, private equity and unclassified have a positive 
relationship with ESG, but not significant, while, pension fund, 
investment advisor and hedge fund have positive relationship 
but also not significant. For the study by Rees (2011), the 
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pension fund has negatively significant on environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) score which is in line with this study.  In 
addition, Rees (2011) also found that government has a positive 
significant relationship with social and environmental score 
while insignificant positive impacts on governance. It might 
support this finding in this study since the test on ESG is not 
based on individual score but as overall score. However, based 
on the previous study mention that, this relationship still unclear 
and was debated by the researcher (Rees, 2011). 
 
 
4.4.4. Joint or Overall Testing (F-test) 
The test for overall explanatory power of regression is called an 
F - test. The basic is same with the T-test and the difference only 
for T-test is for individual Explanatory. The hypothesis to F-test 
is:- 
H0 : β1 = 0 
H1 : β2  0 
 
For the first model, the probability for all equations in Table 
4.4.4 (a) are less than significant level which is 10%. It means the 
null hypotheses are rejected and it is strongly significant. In 
other words, it explained that all the explanatory variables; ESG, 
sales and leverage are strongly significant or influence on 
company performance; ROE, ROA, PTMR and PB.  
Contrary in the second model, the probability is 53.67% as 
shown in Table 4.4.4 (b) which higher than 10% of significance 
level. Thus, the null hypothesis is failed to be rejected and it 
shows that the explanatory variables; PNSNFN, GOV, INV, 
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PVTEQT, UNSD, HDFN will not give any impact towards ESG. It is 
strongly not significant on ESG.   
 
 First Equation Second Equation Third Equation Forth Equation 
Number of obs. 900 1188 1188 1185 
F 30.60041 19.64273 20.22344 19.81391 
Prob > F 0.000000 0.000000 0.00000 0.000000 
R  squared 0.170539 0.090739 0.093171 0.047920 
Adj R  squared 0.164966 0.086119 0.088564 0.045501 
Table 4.4.4 (a)  F-Test and R
2
 Result for First Model 
 
 Equation 
Number of obs. 9 
F 0.615834 
Prob > F -0.536666 
R  squared 0.534346 
Adj R  squared 0.766444 
Table 4.4.4 (b)  F-Test and R
2
 Result for Second Model 
 
4.4.5. Goodness of Fit Test (R2) 
To test the goodness of fit, in other words, determine the 
variable whether the dependent variable can be explained by 
explanatory variables or not, we look at the R
2
 or adjusted R
2
. 
In the first model in Table 4.4.4 (a), for the first equation, there 
is 17.05% of dependent variables, equity return (ROE) explained 
by the explanatory variables, while the second equation is 
around 9.07% of return on assets (ROA) is explained by the 
independent variables. The next equation is 9.32% of pretax 
margin (PTMR) can be explained by ESG, sales and leverage. For 
the last equation, 4.79% of price to book ratio (PB) is explained 
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by the explanatory variables. The value of R
2
 of these models is 
low because there has other factors can be influenced the 
performance of the company such as macro or micro economics 
factor.  
 
For the second model as shown in Table 4.4.4 (b), even the value 
of R
2
 is 53.43 which can be categorised as high, unfortunately 
the T-test and F-test is not significant. It means that, the 
explanatory variables cannot be used to explain the dependent 
variable, ESG if anything changing in the explanatory variables.  
 
4.5. Summary  
To summarize, the hypotheses for this study: 
Hypothesis 1(a): 
H
0
 : There is no significant link between return on equity and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between return on equity and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
 
The alternative hypothesis was accepted, it means that ESG will 
positively influence or give impact on the return on equity (ROE). 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): 
H
0
 : There is no significant link between return on asset and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between return on asset and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
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The alternative hypothesis was accepted, it means that ESG will 
positively influence or give impact on the return on assets (ROA). 
 
Hypothesis 1(c): 
H
0
 : There is no significant link between pretax margin and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between pretax margin and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
 
The alternative hypothesis was accepted, it means that ESG will 
positively influence or give impact on the pretax margin (PTMR). 
 
Hypothesis 1(d): 
H
0
 : There is no significant link between price to book ratio and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between price to book ratio and 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) 
 
The alternative hypothesis was accepted, it means that ESG will 
positively influence or give impact on the price to book ratio 
(PB). 
 
Hypothesis 2 (a): 
H
0
 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the pension fund  
H
1
 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the pension fund 
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The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the pension 
fund in ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (b): 
H
0
 : There is no link relationship between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the government 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the government 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the government 
in ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (c): 
H
0
 : There is no significant link between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the investment advisor 
H
1
 : There is a significant link between environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) and the investment advisor 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the investment 
advisor in ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
Hypothesis 2 (d): 
H
0
 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the private equity 
H
1
 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the private equity 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the private 
equity in ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
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Hypothesis 2 (e): 
H
0
 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and unclassified 
H
1
 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the classified 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the classified in 
ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (f): 
H
0
 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the hedge fund 
H
1
 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the hedge fund 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the hedge fund  
in ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
Hypothesis 2  (g): 
H
0
 : There is no significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the others 
H
1
 : There is a significant relationship between environmental, 
social, governance (ESG) and the others 
 
The null hypothesis was accepted, it means that the others  in 
ownership will not give impact or influence in ESG. 
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The hypothesises 1 (a) to (d) are to answer the first research question 
which is “The performance of a company that declared in the annual 
report, are they subjective with changing of ESG, while the sales and 
leverage remain the same?”, is achieved when the ESG disclosure 
positively significant on firms performance. While, the hypothesises 2 
(a) to 2 (g) to answer the second research question which is, “Is there any 
impact on environmental, social, governance (ESG) if there any changes in 
component of  an ownership?”, is answered when the findings show the 
ownership of the firms will not give any impact or strongly not 
significant to ESG disclosure..  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5. Introduction  
5.1. Conclusions  
This study seeks to critically evaluate whether the environmental, 
social governance (ESG) performance plays the important role in the 
profitability of the institution or not. Furthermore, this paper also 
wants to investigate the relationship between the environmental, 
social, score (ESG) performance and the ownership of the company. In 
order to achieve these objectives, two models have already tested 
based on Bloomberg Terminal data from five countries which are UK, 
France, Germany, China and Malaysia in the period of four years 
starting from Year 2009 to 2012. Indirectly, this study will able to 
answer the research questions for this study, which are, firstly, “The 
performance of a company that declared in the annual report, are 
they subjective with changing of ESG, while the sales and leverage 
remain the same?”, and secondly, “Is there any impact on 
environmental, social, governance (ESG) if there any changes in 
component of  an ownership?”. 
 
The result of the findings from this study is the environmental, social, 
governance (ESG) disclosure has positively significant on firm 
performance; return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA), pretax 
margin (PTMR) and price to book ratio (PB) in the first model. This 
finding in line with the previous study, Mercer (2009), Gompers et al 
(2003), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) state that higher lever of ESG will 
lead higher of return of the firms. Furthermore, in Evans and Peiris 
(2010) also found that significant positive relationship between ESG 
disclosure and firm performances; return on assets and market to 
book value. This finding backup the stakeholder theory which is 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) direct relationship for Corporate 
Financial Performance (CFP) in Orlitzky et al (2003) and Margolis et al. 
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(2007) study. In addition, it will increase the potential investors in 
considering to make an investment when the ESG disclosure is higher. 
The first research question and aim were achieved from the first 
finding. The other two independent variables which are sales and 
leverage also significant with the firm’s performance. 
 
Unfortunately, for the second finding, they were found a positive 
relationship between government (GOV), private equity (PVTEQT) and 
unclassified with the environmental, social, governance disclosure, 
however it is not significant. The other ownership of firms such as the 
pension fund (PNSN), hedge fund (HDFN) and investment advisor (INV) 
were found to have a negative relationship with ESG disclosure and 
also not significant. There is no evidence support was found that 
supports the findings of this study.  
 
In a nutshell, from this study, we can say that firm performance can 
be influenced by the ESG disclosure. The higher ESG disclosure of the 
firm, the higher their firm’s performance. It might affect from the 
investors seeks additional information about the company before they 
make any investment decision making. It will attract the investors 
when the there any disclose information regarding their 
environmental, social, governance. This is answered the first research 
question, yes the ESG disclosure will affect the firm performance. In 
another model, the finding was shown that the ownership of the 
company is not significant on the ESG disclosure. This finding is 
answered the second research question for this study, no, the 
ownership will not affect the ESG disclosure.  
 
 
 
5.2. Recommendations  
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There has a lot improvement can make it done in future research. For 
the researcher, they can improvise this study by using the same data 
and method, but different resources such as, Bloomberg, FTSE4Good, 
Asset4 and KLD. It will increase the validity and reliability of the 
findings. Besides, we can see whether the result will come out similar 
or not when using the different sources, then we can conclude that 
either different sources will influence the findings or not. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher can also test the data individually based 
on the country because the country might be faced different issue in 
the certain years. It also might impact the findings to be different with 
the previous research. In addition, the future researcher may be can 
add up the related variables such as Return on Equity, the size of the 
company using total assets as controller in the second model. 
Moreover, adding up the period of the study for second model might 
have different results because this study only focused on Year 2012 
for the second model.. So, the hypothesises 2 (a) to (g) can reject the 
null hypothesis.  
 
For the firms, they should increase their environmental, social, 
governance disclosure because it is easier the potential investors or 
firms to make decision making before they invested since this study 
found a positive significant relationship between ESG disclosure and 
firm performance.  
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List of companies 
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1 AAL LN 43 IMT LN 85 STAN LN 
 2 ABF LN 44 ITRK LN 86 SVT LN 
3 ADM LN 45 ITV LN 87 TATE LN 
4 ADN LN 46 JMAT LN 88 TLW LN 
5 AGK LN 47 KGF LN 89 TPK LN 
6 AHT LN 48 LAND LN 90 TSCO LN 
7 AMEC LN 49 LGEN LN 91 TT/ LN 
8 ANTO LN 50 LLOY LN 92 ULVR LN 
9 ARM LN 51 LSE LN 93 UU/ LN 
10 AV/ LN 52 MGGT LN 94 VOD LN 
11 AZN LN 53 MKS LN 95 WEIR LN 
12 BA/ LN 54 MNDI LN 96 WMH LN 
13 BAB LN 55 MRO LN 97 WOS LN 
14 BARC LN 56 MRW LN 98 WPP LN 
15 BATS LN 57 NG/ LN 99 WTB LN 
16 BG/ LN 58 NXT LN 100 ADS GY 
17 BLND LN 59 OML LN 101 ALV GY 
18 BLT LN 60 PFC LN 102 BAS GY 
19 BNZL LN 61 PRU LN 103 BAYN GY 
20 BP/ LN 62 PSN LN 104 BEI GY 
21 BRBY LN 63 PSON LN 105 BMW GY 
22 BSY LN 64 RB/ LN 106 CBK GY 
23 BT/A LN 65 RBS LN 107 CON GY 
24 CCL LN 66 RDSA LN 108 DAI GY 
25 CNA LN 67 RDSB LN 109 DB1 GY 
26 CPG LN 68 REL LN 110 DBK GY 
27 CPI LN 69 REX LN 111 DPW GY 
28 CRH LN 70 RIO LN 112 DTE GY 
29 DGE LN 71 RR/ LN 113 EOAN GY 
30 EXPN LN 72 RRS LN 114 FME GY 
31 EZJ LN 73 RSA LN 115 FRE GY 
32 FRES LN 74 RSL LN 116 HEI GY 
33 GFS LN 75 SAB LN 117 HEN3 GY 
34 GKN LN 76 SBRY LN 118 IFX GY 
35 GLEN LN 77 SDR LN 119 LHA GY 
36 GSK LN 78 SGE LN 120 LIN GY 
37 HL/ LN 79 SHP LN 121 LXS GY 
38 HMSO LN 80 SL/ LN 122 MRK GY 
39 HSBA LN 81 SMIN LN 123 MUV2 GY 
40 IAG LN 82 SN/ LN 124 RWE GY 
41 IHG LN 83 SPD LN 125 SAP GY 
42 IMI LN 84 SSE LN 126 SDF GY 
127 SIE GY   
128 TKA GY   
129 VOW3 GY 
130 AC FP 
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131 ACA FP 
132 AI FP 
133 AIR FP 
134 ALO FP 
135 ALU FP 
136 BN FP 
137 BNP FP 
138 CA FP 
139 CAP FP 
140 CS FP 
141 DG FP 
142 EDF FP 
143 EI FP 
144 EN FP 
145 FP FP 
146 GLE FP 
147 GSZ FP 
148 GTO NA 
149 KER FP 
150 LG FP 
151 LR FP 
152 MC FP 
153 ML FP 
154 MT NA 
155 OR FP 
156 ORA FP 
157 PUB FP 
158 RI FP 
159 RNO FP 
160 SAF FP 
161 SAN FP 
162 SGO FP 
163 SOLB BB 
164 SU FP 
165 TEC FP 
166 UL NA 
167 VIE FP 
168 VIV FP 
169 VK FP 
170 
600000 
CH 
  
171 
600004 
CH 196 
600050 
CH 221 CH 
172 
600005 
CH 197 
600055 
CH 222 
600113 
CH 
  198 600056 223 600115 
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CH CH 
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600007 
CH 199 
600058 
CH 224 
600116 
CH 
174 
600008 
CH 200 
600059 
CH 225 
600118 
CH 
175 
600009 
CH 201 
600060 
CH 226 
600123 
CH 
176 
600010 
CH 202 
600062 
CH 227 
600125 
CH 
177 
600011 
CH 203 
600063 
CH 228 
600132 
CH 
178 
600012 
CH 204 
600066 
CH 229 
600138 
CH 
179 
600015 
CH 205 
600068 
CH 230 
600141 
CH 
180 
600016 
CH 206 
600071 
CH 231 
600143 
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181 
600017 
CH 207 
600072 
CH 232 
600150 
CH 
182 
600018 
CH 208 
600079 
CH 233 
600151 
CH 
183 
600019 
CH 209 
600085 
CH 234 
600153 
CH 
184 
600022 
CH 210 
600086 
CH 235 
600157 
CH 
185 
600026 
CH 211 
600089 
CH 236 
600158 
CH 
186 
600027 
CH 212 
600094 
CH 237 
600160 
CH 
187 
600028 
CH 213 
600096 
CH 238 
600161 
CH 
188 
600029 
CH 214 
600098 
CH 239 
600163 
CH 
189 
600030 
CH 215 
600100 
CH 240 
600166 
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600031 
CH 216 
600104 
CH 241 
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600033 
CH 217 
600108 
CH 242 
600170 
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600036 
CH 218 
600109 
CH 243 
600171 
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193 
600037 
CH 219 
600110 
CH 244 
600176 
CH 
194 
600038 
CH 220 
600111 
CH 245 
600177 
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195 600048   600112   
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600183 
CH 271 
600261 
CH  297 PEP MK 
247 
600187 
CH 272 
600266 
CH  298 PETD MK 
248 600188 273 600267  299 PTG MK 
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CH CH 
249 
600190 
CH 274 
600269 
CH  300 RHBC MK 
250 
600193 
CH 275 
600270 
CH  301 ROTH MK 
251 
600195 
CH 276 
600271 
CH  302 SIME MK 
252 
600196 
CH 277 
600276 
CH  303 T MK 
253 
600197 
CH 278 
600277 
CH  304 TNB MK 
254 
600199 
CH 279 
600282 
CH  305 
UMWH 
MK 
255 
600206 
CH 280 
600288 
CH  306 YTL MK 
256 
600208 
CH 281 
600290 
CH   
257 
600216 
CH 282 
600298 
CH   
258 
600218 
CH 283 
600300 
CH 
259 
600219 
CH 284 AMM MK 
260 
600221 
CH 285 
AXIATA 
MK 
261 
600227 
CH 286 CIMB MK 
262 
600236 
CH 287 DIGI MK 
263 
600243 
CH 288 GENM MK 
264 
600246 
CH 289 GENT MK 
265 
600251 
CH 290 HLBK MK 
266 
600252 
CH 291 IOI MK 
267 
600255 
CH 292 KLK MK 
268 
600256 
CH 293 
MAXIS 
MK 
269 
600259 
CH 294 MAY MK 
270 
600260 
CH 295 MISC MK 
  296 PBK MK 
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Likelihood Test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ1ROE   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 57.950031 (3,893) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 160.091249 3 0.0000 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:04   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 900  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.181572 0.055947 3.245456 0.0012 
ESG 0.165756 0.109856 1.508848 0.1317 
LOG(SALES) -0.012157 0.008849 -1.373915 0.1698 
LEVERAGE -0.001749 0.000776 -2.252454 0.0245 
     
     R-squared 0.009058    Mean dependent var 0.095617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005741    S.D. dependent var 0.368276 
S.E. of regression 0.367217    Akaike info criterion 0.838708 
Sum squared resid 120.8243    Schwarz criterion 0.860052 
Log likelihood -373.4188    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.846862 
F-statistic 2.730188    Durbin-Watson stat 2.146652 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.042859    
     
     
 
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ1ROA   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 3.676386 (3,1181) 0.0118 
Period Chi-square 11.043046 3 0.0115 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:07   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
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     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.121883 0.007822 15.58284 0.0000 
ESG 0.074221 0.015820 4.691600 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -0.009045 0.001262 -7.168128 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.000736 0.000110 -6.707141 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.082247    Mean dependent var 0.055260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.079922    S.D. dependent var 0.062036 
S.E. of regression 0.059505    Akaike info criterion -2.802151 
Sum squared resid 4.192361    Schwarz criterion -2.785047 
Log likelihood 1668.478    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.795705 
F-statistic 35.36922    Durbin-Watson stat 0.454874 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ1PTMR   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 2.491694 (3,1181) 0.0587 
Period Chi-square 7.495691 3 0.0577 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: PTMR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:11   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 41.93655 2.751444 15.24165 0.0000 
ESG 35.33438 5.555610 6.360126 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -4.300160 0.443194 -9.702651 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.132423 0.038552 -3.434939 0.0006 
     
     R-squared 0.087431    Mean dependent var 15.65116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085119    S.D. dependent var 21.85761 
S.E. of regression 20.90667    Akaike info criterion 8.921375 
Sum squared resid 517513.3    Schwarz criterion 8.938480 
Log likelihood -5295.297    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.927821 
F-statistic 37.81227    Durbin-Watson stat 0.756308 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ1PB   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1.863704 (3,1178) 0.1339 
Period Chi-square 5.611032 3 0.1321 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: PB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:13   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1185  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 8.547187 0.837482 10.20582 0.0000 
ESG 5.989743 1.693311 3.537296 0.0004 
LOG(SALES) -0.958941 0.135255 -7.089866 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 0.027724 0.011695 2.370608 0.0179 
     
     R-squared 0.047920    Mean dependent var 3.483041 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045501    S.D. dependent var 6.488749 
S.E. of regression 6.339407    Akaike info criterion 6.534817 
Sum squared resid 47462.13    Schwarz criterion 6.551957 
Log likelihood -3867.879    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.541278 
F-statistic 19.81391    Durbin-Watson stat 0.898775 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Hausman Test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ1ROE   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 173.850076 3 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     ESG 0.190058 0.165756 0.000018 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -0.013549 -0.012157 0.000000 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.001789 -0.001749 0.000000 0.5140 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:05   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 900  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.185707 0.051388 3.613836 0.0003 
ESG 0.190058 0.100768 1.886092 0.0596 
LOG(SALES) -0.013549 0.008115 -1.669531 0.0954 
LEVERAGE -0.001789 0.000714 -2.504957 0.0124 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.170539    Mean dependent var 0.095617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164966    S.D. dependent var 0.368276 
S.E. of regression 0.336531    Akaike info criterion 0.667496 
Sum squared resid 101.1352    Schwarz criterion 0.704848 
Log likelihood -293.3732    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.681765 
F-statistic 30.60041    Durbin-Watson stat 1.695628 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ1ROA   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 11.029159 3 0.0116 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     ESG 0.074062 0.074221 0.000001 0.8241 
LOG(SALES) -0.009044 -0.009045 0.000000 0.9813 
LEVERAGE -0.000727 -0.000736 0.000000 0.0034 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:08   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.121698 0.007797 15.60839 0.0000 
ESG 0.074062 0.015783 4.692588 0.0000 
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LOG(SALES) -0.009044 0.001258 -7.191550 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.000727 0.000109 -6.640159 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.090739    Mean dependent var 0.055260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086119    S.D. dependent var 0.062036 
S.E. of regression 0.059304    Akaike info criterion -2.806396 
Sum squared resid 4.153571    Schwarz criterion -2.776464 
Log likelihood 1673.999    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.795115 
F-statistic 19.64273    Durbin-Watson stat 0.430427 
     
     
 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ1PTMR   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 7.475082 3 0.0582 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     ESG 35.346189 35.334380 0.064733 0.9630 
LOG(SALES) -4.300148 -4.300160 0.000035 0.9984 
LEVERAGE -0.129518 -0.132423 0.000001 0.0109 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: PTMR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:11   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 41.86070 2.746829 15.23965 0.0000 
ESG 35.34619 5.550975 6.367565 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -4.300148 0.442398 -9.720085 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.129518 0.038496 -3.364455 0.0008 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.093171    Mean dependent var 15.65116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088564    S.D. dependent var 21.85761 
S.E. of regression 20.86727    Akaike info criterion 8.920116 
Sum squared resid 514258.4    Schwarz criterion 8.950049 
Log likelihood -5291.549    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.931397 
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F-statistic 20.22344    Durbin-Watson stat 0.743516 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for First Model 
 
 ESG ROE ROA PTMR PB SALES LEVERAGE 
 Mean  0.329796  0.098944  0.055058  15.85658  3.497902  14935.99  24.64759 
 Median  0.301653  0.065034  0.044082  10.68120  2.188550  3244.632  23.23275 
 Maximum  0.723140  3.148787  0.529492  277.1499  157.3917  294786.4  73.54960 
 Minimum  0.090909 -0.951689 -0.121178 -123.3111  0.272100  6.888200  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.159462  0.367274  0.061600  22.00396  6.412314  32414.47  15.79870 
 Skewness  0.303019  1.523403  2.459942  3.854847  14.07843  5.002041  0.475564 
 Kurtosis  1.937398  10.10711  15.11591  41.81460  295.6974  35.03305  2.847912 
        
 Jarque-Bera  74.13439  2282.140  8678.273  79801.39  4395283.  57436.08  47.31658 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
        
 Sum  392.1272  90.63298  67.06029  19392.60  4267.441  18281649  30168.66 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  30.20868  123.4245  4.617984  591661.2  50122.56  1.29E+12  305259.5 
        
 Observations  1189  916  1218  1223  1220  1224  1224 
 
 
Regression Analysis for First Model 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:05   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 900  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.185707 0.051388 3.613836 0.0003 
ESG 0.190058 0.100768 1.886092 0.0596 
LOG(SALES) -0.013549 0.008115 -1.669531 0.0954 
LEVERAGE -0.001789 0.000714 -2.504957 0.0124 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.170539    Mean dependent var 0.095617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164966    S.D. dependent var 0.368276 
S.E. of regression 0.336531    Akaike info criterion 0.667496 
Sum squared resid 101.1352    Schwarz criterion 0.704848 
Log likelihood -293.3732    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.681765 
F-statistic 30.60041    Durbin-Watson stat 1.695628 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:09   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.121698 0.007797 15.60839 0.0000 
ESG 0.074062 0.015783 4.692588 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -0.009044 0.001258 -7.191550 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.000727 0.000109 -6.640159 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.090739    Mean dependent var 0.055260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086119    S.D. dependent var 0.062036 
S.E. of regression 0.059304    Akaike info criterion -2.806396 
Sum squared resid 4.153571    Schwarz criterion -2.776464 
Log likelihood 1673.999    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.795115 
F-statistic 19.64273    Durbin-Watson stat 0.430427 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: PTMR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:12   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1188  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 41.86070 2.746829 15.23965 0.0000 
ESG 35.34619 5.550975 6.367565 0.0000 
LOG(SALES) -4.300148 0.442398 -9.720085 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.129518 0.038496 -3.364455 0.0008 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.093171    Mean dependent var 15.65116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088564    S.D. dependent var 21.85761 
S.E. of regression 20.86727    Akaike info criterion 8.920116 
Sum squared resid 514258.4    Schwarz criterion 8.950049 
Log likelihood -5291.549    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.931397 
F-statistic 20.22344    Durbin-Watson stat 0.743516 
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Dependent Variable: PB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/14   Time: 23:14   
Sample: 2009 2012   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 306   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1185  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 8.547187 0.837482 10.20582 0.0000 
ESG 5.989743 1.693311 3.537296 0.0004 
LOG(SALES) -0.958941 0.135255 -7.089866 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 0.027724 0.011695 2.370608 0.0179 
     
     R-squared 0.047920    Mean dependent var 3.483041 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045501    S.D. dependent var 6.488749 
S.E. of regression 6.339407    Akaike info criterion 6.534817 
Sum squared resid 47462.13    Schwarz criterion 6.551957 
Log likelihood -3867.879    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.541278 
F-statistic 19.81391    Durbin-Watson stat 0.898775 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Second Model 
 
Date: 04/26/14   
Time: 20:21      
Sample: 1 306     
      
       ESG PNSNFN GOV INV PVTEQT 
      
       Mean  0.340175  2.321300  7.374637  44.21823  0.360878 
 Median  0.301653  2.232000  4.854000  47.74300  0.006000 
 Maximum  0.714286  12.46300  76.28600  99.39100  5.403000 
 Minimum  0.099174  0.000000  0.054000  0.016000  0.001000 
 Std. Dev.  0.151853  2.036461  9.651897  32.05483  1.172750 
 Skewness  0.418044  2.468047  3.670078 -0.032880  3.461055 
 Kurtosis  1.909474  12.54142  20.01424  1.407122  13.84719 
      
 Jarque-Bera  23.44629  528.9335  3390.701  28.27514  338.0532 
 Probability  0.000008  0.000000  0.000000  0.000001  0.000000 
      
 Sum  101.3720  255.3430  1747.789  11806.27  17.68300 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  6.848625  452.0418  21985.55  273318.2  66.01647 
      
 Observations  298  110  237  267  49 
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Regression Analysis for Second Model 
 
Dependent Variable: ESG   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/14   Time: 20:25   
Sample (adjusted): 101 152   
Included observations: 9 after adjustments  
ESG=C(1)+C(2)*PNSNFN+C(3)*GOV+C(4)* INV+C(5)*PVTEQT+C(6) 
        *UNCLASSIFIED+C(7)* HDFN  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.555383 0.186789 2.973314 0.0969 
C(2) -0.138577 0.300611 -0.460984 0.6901 
C(3) 0.031849 0.042198 0.754759 0.5292 
C(4) -0.004284 0.004189 -1.022810 0.4140 
C(5) 4.334201 42.82770 0.101201 0.9286 
C(6) 0.057829 0.052301 1.105712 0.3841 
C(7) -0.227135 0.290973 -0.780604 0.5168 
     
     R-squared 0.615834    Mean dependent var 0.533525 
Adjusted R-squared -0.536666    S.D. dependent var 0.144022 
S.E. of regression 0.178533    Akaike info criterion -0.556603 
Sum squared resid 0.063748    Schwarz criterion -0.403206 
Log likelihood 9.504714    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.887633 
F-statistic 0.534346    Durbin-Watson stat 3.116192 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.766444    
     
     
 
 
